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Preface
Standing on the brink of a biotechnology revolution in agriculture, it is timely to take stock of the investmentsand institutional trends regarding agricultural R&D worldwide. In this report we assemble and assess new andupdated evidence regarding investments in agricultural R&D by public and private agencies, contrasting 
developments in rich and poor countries.The payoffs to investments in agricultural research are considerable, and
appear to remain so, but there are new policy concerns about the roles of the public and private sectors in funding
and carrying out the research, especially in light of the revolutionary changes in the underlying sciences and the 
incentives facing research (as intellectual property regimes become stronger and international trade in science and
technologies grows).
This report tracks trends in agricultural R&D over the past several decades.We also put research policies in a
much longer timeframe, highlighting the critical importance that the accumulated stock of scientific knowledge has on
today’s productivity performance and its effect on innovation and economic growth in the future.
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To Thomas Malthus, the math was compelling: exponential population growth outrunning linear growth infood supplies—the latter dependent on land area, a resource that must inevitably reach a physical
limit—with catastrophic consequences.Writing in 1798, Malthus had no way of anticipating how different the
future path of food supply would be from the past.Yet his vision of the future is surprisingly resilient, persisting
in the minds of many despite two centuries of evidence to the contrary. Predictions of the inevitability of
world famine have been proven wrong by the dramatic increases in agricultural productivity, especially in the
later half of the 20th century (Box 1). The growth in productivity has enabled world food supplies to outpace
the unprecedented increase in food demand caused by jumps in the growth rate of world income, and the
doubling and redoubling of the human population.
Introduction
The miracle of the past four decades is that today’s
farmers are feeding almost twice as many people far
better from virtually the same cropland base.The world
used about 1.4 billion hectares of land for crops in 1961
and only 1.5 billion hectares in 1998 to get twice the
amount of grain and oilseeds. Producing today’s food
supply with 1960 crop yields would probably require at
least an additional 300 million hectares of land, an area
equal to the entire land mass of Western Europe.
At the same time, food prices have declined to the
lowest levels in history, to the benefit of consumers who
are able to eat better while spending less and less of
their budget on food.Although, unconscionably, hundreds
of millions of people are still food-insecure, this is not
related to lack of overall production but more to the
location of production and the access to food by coun-
tries, households, and individuals living on the edge of
subsistence.
The current favorable dynamic balance between
overall food supply and demand was not inevitable;
neither was it a triumph of Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
Nor should it be taken for granted that it will persist. It
has been the result of successful interactions among
farmers, input suppliers, and an overwhelmingly publicly
supported research and extension system that furnished
innovations and relevant knowledge for free. Little land
remains for the expansion of agricultural production
(and some of the land, water, and other natural
resources needed for agriculture are being degraded and
diverted to other uses in other sectors), so crop and
livestock yields must continue to increase for the
decades ahead.They must then be maintained—at these
much higher levels—for the foreseeable future against
environmental, biological, and other factors that under-
mine past gains in production. Continued strong
performance in research and innovation is needed to
maintain a favorable food balance if, in addition to the 6
billion people we already have, we are to feed 3 billion
more over the next half century.
As the 20th century dawned, whole new vistas in
agricultural R&D were opening up. Public funding for
research was on the rise, initially in the rich countries,
then gradually spreading to colonial countries and even-
tually to other parts of the developing world.A century
later, the agricultural sciences are again shifting gears,
delving deeper into the genetics of life. But now the
public purpose in agricultural R&D is less focused and
more closely scrutinized compared to a century ago.
Complacency has crept in, too: some question the need
for continued public funding, thinking the world’s food
problems are solved or constrained by things other than
R&D or that the private sector will do the job. None of
these views is correct. Moreover, the public policy
choices made now have far-reaching ramifications, just as
the same choices did a hundred years ago.
Despite the buzz about biotechnology, informatics,
and a myriad other technologies, the lag between
investing in innovation and reaping the rewards is still
substantial—measured in decades, not years.This is
especially true for biologically based sciences like agricul-
ture. It is timely to take stock of the state of agricultural
R&D and to get a global perspective, not least because
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of increasing international interdependence regarding
agricultural R&D. In this report, we provide new esti-
mates of investments in agricultural research worldwide,
updating our views of public roles and contrasting them
with private efforts.
To the public, science seems to progress through a
series of breakthroughs. The occasional genius does
make a great leap forward, but the magic of science
stems from the patient and persistent accretion of new
knowledge. Today’s scientists stand firmly on the shoul-
ders of those who went before them. While invest-
ments in research give rise to new ideas, know-how, and
innovations in the near term, these innovations draw
directly on the efforts of past research. It is the accumu-
lation of research results over the long haul that
accounts for the differences in agricultural productivity
observed around the world.We developed money meas-
ures to quantify the stocks of knowledge that resulted
from agricultural R&D spending in the United States and
Africa to illustrate this growth and to encourage policy-
makers to think in the long term
For thousands of years, farmers eked out
yield gains by collecting and selecting the
best and most productive seeds and by
improving cultivation and organic fertiliza-
tion techniques.The expansion of culti-
vated areas accounted for most of the
increases in total production.A century
ago, Gregor Mendel’s research describing
the pattern of genetic inheritance, first
published by the Austrian botanist and
monk in 1865, was rediscovered and recon-
firmed.Thus the modern era of scientific
breeding began.
Starting in the late 19th century, yields
of major crops in North America, Europe,
and Japan began to increase at rates well
beyond historical precedent. For example, beginning with an average wheat yield of 15 bushels per acre in 1866 
(the earliest year for which data are available), it took 103 years, until 1969, for US yields to double (Figure B1).Yield
growth accelerated in the second half of the 20th century; it took only 43 years for US wheat yields to double and reach
the much higher 43 bushels per acre reaped in 1999. Similar yield accelerations occurred in many other crops in the
United States.
Many crops in developed countries saw a sharp up-turn in their yield performance in the middle of the century as an
increasing number of genetically improved varieties, targeted to particular agroecologies, became available. Beginning in
the 1950s and continuing at an accelerated pace in the 1960s and 1970s, improved varieties also became available from
international and national agricultural research centers to many more developing-country farmers, and yields took off in
many, but not all, of those countries as well (for example, see Figure B1 for wheat).
A key to these widespread yield gains was the rapid spread of modern (often short-statured, so-called semi-dwarf) rice
and wheat varieties throughout the developing world, initially through the adoption of cultivars developed in interna-
tional research centers over wide areas with favorable environments, and then via adaptation of this germplasm to local
ecologies and consumer preferences.Asia was quickest to embrace these new varieties, while varietal change lagged in
sub-Saharan Africa, partly because of the great diversity in agroecologies.
Globally, yields have climbed steadily in all major cereals, at least since the 1960s.About 95 percent of the production
gains since 1961 have come from increasing yields, except in Africa where about half the gains have come from
expanding the area of cultivation.
MENDEL’S LEGACY
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Figure B1  Wheat yields
SOURCE:  Pardey, Chang-Kang, and Alston (in preparation).
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In the broad sweep of agricultural history, organized scientific research is a recent phenomenon, althoughfarmers have tinkered with different techniques for over 10,000 years, and kings and emperors have
collected plants on an ad hoc basis for millennia. In the late 18th century,Thomas Jefferson, risking penalty of
death, smuggled rice seeds out of Italy in the lining of his coat to encourage cultivation of the crop in South
Carolina.1 Science-based solutions to agricultural problems did not take root until the formation of agricul-
tural societies throughout the United Kingdom and Europe in the early to mid-1700s. By the mid-1800s, the
evolution of these societies gave rise to agricultural “experiment stations,” beginning in Germany and England
and spreading to the rest of Europe and, eventually, to the New World. Colonization spread them to the devel-
oping world. Japan, a much less-developed country than America or Europe for the 19th and most of the 20th
century, measured by per capita income,2 paralleled developments in the West by publicly funding and
conducting agricultural research beginning in the mid-1800s.
A History of Public Agricultural R&D
Scientific agriculture developed hand in hand with
these research institutions. Darwin’s theory of evolution,
the pure-line theory of Johannson, the mutation theory of
de Vries, and the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of inheri-
tance all contributed to the rise of plant breeding in the
beginning of the 20th century. Pasteur’s germ theory of
disease and the development of vaccines opened up lines
of research in the veterinary sciences.The effectiveness of
this body of science in raising yields and solving farmers’
production problems became evident in the first half of
the 20th century.
Progress in the science of genetics sped up around
the middle of the 20th century after Hersey and Chase,
Watson and Crick, and others uncovered the role and
structure of DNA.These findings engendered a huge
research effort, largely publicly funded, that was directed
mainly at the application of modern recombinant DNA
methods to human health. Progress in this area also led to
the development of genetic markers and transformation
techniques useful to agriculture.The result was a wave of
biological innovations, which, combined with changes in
controls on intellectual property rights, attracted private
investment.
Taken together, these developments are fundamen-
tally changing the nature of the agricultural sciences, public
and private roles, and the balance between locally
provided and internationally traded R&D goods and serv-
ices.And they will continue to affect all these aspects as
we move into the 21st century.
Recent Public Research Trends
Worldwide, public investments in agricultural research
nearly doubled, in inflation-adjusted terms, from an esti-
mated $11.8 billion (1993 international dollars)3 in 1976
to nearly $21.7 billion in 1995 (Table 1).4 Yet for many
parts of the world, growth in spending during the 1990s
slowed dramatically. In the rich countries, public invest-
ment grew just 0.2 percent annually between 1991 and
1996, compared with 2.2 percent per year during the
1980s. In Africa, there was no growth at all—the 
continuation of a longer-run trend, with more rapid
growth in spending in the 1960s (a post-independence
period of institution building for many African countries,
underwritten with funds from the North)5 gradually giving
way to debt crises in the 1980s and curbs on government
spending and waning donor support through the 1990s. In
Asia, the 1990s figure was 4.4 percent, compared with 7.5
percent the previous decade. Growth slowed in the
Middle East and North Africa as well.
China is an exception. Growth in spending during the
first half of the 1990s rebounded from a period of lower
growth during the last half of the 1980s.6 Things look a
little better in Latin America, too, with growth in spending
of 2.9 percent per year from 1991 to 1996, following little
or no growth during the dismal decade of the 1980s. But
the recovery seems fragile and is not shared widely
throughout the region.7 Public research in countries like
Brazil and Colombia, which did better in the early 1990s,
suffered cutbacks in the later part of the decade, and
many of the poorer (and smaller) countries have failed to
experience any sustained growth in funding for the past
several decades.
The distribution of spending on agricultural research
has shifted as well. In the 1990s, for the first time, devel-
oping countries as a group spent more than the devel-
oped countries on public agricultural research (Figure 1).
Among the rich countries, $10.2 billion in public spending
was concentrated in just a handful of countries. In 1995,
the United States, Japan, France, and Germany accounted
for two-thirds of this public research, about the same as
two decades before. Just three developing countries—
China, India, and Brazil—spent 44 percent of the devel-
oping world’s public agricultural research money in 1995,
up from 35 percent in the mid-1970s.
These regional totals mask even more variation
among countries. For example, more than 40 percent of
19 African countries spent less than $20 million on agri-
cultural R&D in 1991.8 Only two countries (Kenya and
South Africa) spent more than $100 million.Among 15
Latin American countries, four spent less than $10 million
in 1995, while the two largest countries, Brazil and
Mexico, spent about $900 million and $300 million,
respectively.
Geography is one way to group countries; another
way is to group them according to per capita income.
Figure 2 gives a breakdown of agricultural R&D spending
for high-, middle-, and low-income countries.The research
shares for high-income countries are equivalent to those
noted for developed countries in Figure 1. Spending by
4
Table 1—Global public agricultural research expenditures, 1976-95
SOURCES: Sub-Saharan Africa: 1976-91 data based on Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema (1997); 1992-96 estimates represent an extrapolation
based on trends in total government spending in Africa from World Bank (2000), adjusted for an estimated continuing decline in the share of agri-
cultural research in total government spending, based on Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema (1997). China: 1976-96 from Fan, Qian, and Zhang
(2001). Asia and Pacific, excluding China: 1976-92 based on Pardey and Roseboom (1989) and Pardey, Roseboom, and Fan (1998); 1992–96
estimates used data for Bangladesh from Ahmed and Karim (2001), India from Pray and Basant (1999), Indonesia from Fuglie (1999), Malaysia from
Fuglie (1998a), South Korea from Choi (2000), and Thailand from Fuglie (1998b). Latin America and the Caribbean: 1976-96 from Beintema,
Avila, and Pardey (2001), Beintema, Romano, and Pardey (2000), Beintema, Zambrano et al. (2000), Beintema, Hareau, et al. (2000), Beintema,
Pardey et al. (2001a, b), Roseboom, Cremers, and Lauckner (2001), and unpublished survey returns. Middle East and North Africa: 1976-85
from Pardey and Roseboom (1989); 1986-96 estimates based on data for Egypt, Iran, and Turkey (an estimated 50 percent of the region’s total agri-
cultural R&D investments in 1985) from ICARDA et al. (1999). Developed countries: authors’ estimates based on Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig
(1999), Pardey and Roseboom (1989), OECD (2000). US data compiled from various USDA sources (including USDA-CRIS, various issues), and
other specific country sources for Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.
NOTES: These are provisional estimates and exclude Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. Developed countries include only
high-income countries specified by the World Bank in 1996, the latest year of our data series.The number of countries included in regional totals
are shown in Parentheses.
a Three-year averages centered on 1985 and 1995.
b Developing-country total includes Greece, designated as a middle-income country in 1996 by the World Bank (1996) criteria we used to group  
the countries here.
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Expenditures 1976 1985a 1995a
(million 1993 international dollars)
Developing Countries (119)b 4,738 7,676 11,469
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 993 1,181 1,270
China 709 1,396 2,063
Asia and Pacific, Excluding China (23) 1,321 2,453 4,619
Latin America and the Caribbean (35) 1,087 1,583 1,947
Middle East and North Africa (15) 582 981 1,521
Developed Countries (34) 7,099 8,748 10,215
TOTAL (153) 11,837 16,424 21,692
Annual Growth Rates 1976-81 1981-86 1986-91 1991-96 1976-96
(percent per year)
Developing Countries (119) 7.0 3.9 3.9 3.6 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 1.7 1.4 0.5 -0.2 1.5
China 7.8 8.9 2.8 5.5 5.2
Asia and Pacific, Excluding China (23) 8.2 5.1 7.5 4.4 6.5
Latin America and the Caribbean (35) 9.5 0.5 0.4 2.9 2.5
Middle East and North Africa (15) 7.4 4.0 4.2 3.5 4.8
Developed Countries (34) 2.5 1.9 2.2 0.2 1.9
TOTAL (153) 4.5 2.9 3.0 2.0 3.2
Cross-country comparisons of agricultural
R&D expenditures, like most international
comparisons of economic activity, are
confounded by substantial differences in price
levels among countries. Converting research
expenditures from different countries to a
single currency using official exchange rates
tends to understate the quantity of research
resources used in economies with relatively low
prices, while overstating the quantity of
resources used in countries with high prices.1
This is particularly a problem when valuing
something like expenditures on agricultural
R&D, where typically 60 to 70 percent of the
expenditures are on local scientists and support
staff, not capital or other goods and services
that are commonly traded internationally.2
Most of the research expenditures in this
report are denominated in 1993 “international
dollars” using purchasing-power parities (PPPs)
to do the currency conversions.At present,
there is no entirely satisfactory method for
comparing consumption or expenditures
among countries at different points in time (or
for that matter, at the same point in time).
Unfortunately, the choice of deflator and
currency converter can have substantial conse-
quences for both the measure obtained and its
interpretation.We use a procedure described by
Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1992) that first
deflates research expenditures expressed in
current local currency units to a base year set of prices (1993, in our case) using a local price deflator and then converts
to a common currency unit (specifically, international dollars) using PPPs for 1993 obtained from the World Bank (2000)
rather than the more familiar official exchange rates. For convenience of interpretation, the reference currency—here an
international dollar—is set equal to a US dollar in the benchmark year. Figure B2 contrasts the regional expenditure
shares when using PPPs versus official exchange rates to do the currency conversion.The right-hand panel denotes total
1996 research spending in international dollars and the corresponding regional shares obtained using PPPs.The US dollar
estimates in the left-hand panel were obtained using the same underlying R&D data together with official exchange
rates.Taking the PPP estimates to be more representative of the amount of research resources committed to research, the
US dollar estimates overstate the share of developed-country research resources in the global total and grossly under-
state the African, Chinese, and other Asia and Pacific shares.
1 A country’s international price level is the ratio of its purchasing-power parity (PPP) rate to its official currency exchange rate for US dollars. In other
words, the international price level is an index of the costs of goods in one country at the current rate of exchange relative to the costs of the same bundle
of goods in a numeraire country, in this case the United States. For example, in 1993 the ratio of PPP to exchange rate for Japan was 1.57, indicating that
average prices in Japan were 57 percent higher than they were in the United States.The corresponding ratio for Kenya was 0.20, meaning that a bundle of
goods and services purchased for $100 in the United States cost only $20 dollars in Kenya.
2 In 1992, the average salary and fringe benefits paid professors working at large public institutions in the United States was $56,300 (1992 prices).A compa-
rable annual salary and benefits for a Kenyan scientist with a PhD working for KARI (the national government’s main agricultural research institute) was
143,400 Kenyan shillings (equivalent to 13,548 international dollars when converted using PPPs or only US$2,760 when converted using official exchange
rates), while a Brazilian PhD working for Embrapa earned an average of 102 million cruzeiros (38,916 international dollars or US$25,284).
A YARDSTICK FOR AGRICULTURAL R&D
Figure B2  Public research spending in US versus international dollars, 
    1996
SOURCE:  See Table 1. US dollar exchange rate for 1996 is from the World Bank 
(2000).
NOTE:  See Table 1. 
1996: $17.0 billion (1993 US dollars)
1996: $21.9 billion (1993 international dollars)
Developed
countries (44%) 
Middle East and
North Africa (5%)
Developed 
countries (69%) 
Other Asia and
Pacific (10%) 
Sub-Saharan
Africa (3%) 
China (3%)
Latin America and
Caribbean (9%)
Other Asia and
Pacific (23%) 
Middle East and
North Africa (8%)
Latin America and
Caribbean (9%)
China (10%)Sub-Saharan
Africa (6%) 
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Box 2
low-income countries grew fastest, so their
combined share of the global total increased
from 19 percent in 1976 to 28 percent in the
mid-1990s. However, this trend is deceiving,
reflecting the comparatively rapid growth of
India and China, two large countries whose
developments dominate the group average. In
fact, the low-income countries as a group,
excluding China and India, lost some ground.
Their share of global agricultural R&D
spending dropped from 8.7 percent in 1976
to 8.3 percent in 1996.
Research and agroecologies
The figures above refer to national invest-
ments, but agricultural innovation need not be
home grown.A striking feature of the history
of agricultural development is that technology
can be bought, borrowed, or as Jefferson
showed, stolen.The result is that it moves
across borders, both by design and by acci-
dent. Nonetheless, most agricultural tech-
nologies are sensitive to local climate, soil, and
other biophysical attributes, making them less
easily transferable. Soybeans are day-length
sensitive, so different varieties must be devel-
oped for different latitudes. Likewise, many
tropical soils are naturally acidic, a less preva-
lent problem in temperate areas, and conse-
quently, crops that thrive in temperate soils
can fail or falter under tropical conditions.9
Unlike medical and mechanical innova-
tions that are applicable from Tijuana to
Tokyo, it is usually necessary to adapt agricul-
tural technologies to local conditions.This
has implications for the diffusion of agricul-
tural research results and for the biases that
are introduced when research is concen-
trated in relatively few places.The more
similar countries are in terms of their agroe-
cological attributes, the more likely it is that
research done in one country will be appli-
cable, with comparatively little adaptation, in
the other country. For these reasons, it can
be useful to group countries according to
their agroecology. One option is to divide
them into tropical countries (which have
year-round adjusted temperatures greater
than 18 degrees Celsius on average10) and
nontropical countries. In 1997, about 1.44
billion hectares (62 percent of the world’s
agricultural land) and 2.6 billion people (45
percent of the world’s population) were in
Figure 1  Regional shares in public agricultural research expenditures, 
 1976 and 1995
SOURCE:  See Table 1. 
NOTES:  See Table 1. Shares for 1995 represent three-year averages centered on 
this year.
1976: $11.8 billion (1993 international dollars)
Middle East and
North Africa (5%)
Developed 
countries (60%) 
Other Asia and
Pacific (11%) 
Sub-Saharan
Africa (8%) 
China (6%)
Latin America and
Caribbean (9%)
1995: $21.7 billion (1993 international dollars)
Developed
countries (47%) 
Other Asia and
Pacific (21%) 
Middle East and
North Africa (7%)
Latin America and
Caribbean (9%)
China (10%)
Sub-Saharan
Africa (6%) 
Other (0.4%)
Other (0.2%)
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Figure 2  Public agricultural research spending by income class, 1976-95
SOURCE: See Table 1.
NOTES: See Table 1. Income classes are specified by the World Bank (1996).
low-income = < $726 per capita/year
middle-income = $726-8,955 per capita/year
high-income = > $8,955 per capita/year
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tropical countries.11 By value, this greatly
exceeds the tropical-country share of public
research spending (about 28 percent) but
almost exactly matches the share of agricul-
tural output that comes from the tropics,
almost all of it from the developing countries
(Figure 3).
About 65 percent of the nontropical
world’s agricultural research occurs in devel-
oped countries. Developing countries such as
Argentina, China, and South Korea, with
broadly similar growing conditions, will find
this research relatively easy to adapt.
However, transferring technologies from
nontropical regions to tropical countries like
Brazil, India, and many parts of Africa often
requires research fitted to local realities.
Who does the public research?
In developed countries, about 43 percent
of the public research was done by universi-
ties in the mid-1990s, compared with 25
percent in Latin America and only 10 percent
in Africa (in 1991) (Figure 4).The eleven Latin
American countries in our sample have
moved more in the direction of the devel-
oped countries, with universities playing an
ever greater role.
Most of the public research in Africa is
done by government agencies; at least that
was the situation in 1991 (and for many years
before that). However, in Africa as well as
Latin America, nonprofit institutions perform
more of the public research than they do in
developed countries. Many of these
nonprofits are linked to producer organiza-
tions, conducting research on beverage crops
like tea and coffee or fiber crops like cotton,
and are funded largely from taxes levied on
production or exports or by voluntary
contributions made by producers. In 1996,
Colombia had 12 nonprofits conducting
about one-quarter of the country’s agricul-
tural R&D. Many of these Colombian agencies
initiated research several decades ago, while
in Central American countries like Costa
Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, nonprofit
research is a much more recent phenom-
enon. In the mid-1970s, nonprofits spent only
5 percent of the agricultural R&D dollars in
these Central American countries; two
decades later, they represented 45 percent 
of total R&D spending.12
Figure 3  Tropical and nontropical perspectives on public agricultural 
                R&D spending, 1976 and 1995
SOURCE:  See Table 1. 
NOTES:  See Table 1. Shares for 1995 represent three-year averages centered on 
this year.
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Figure 4  The institutional orientation of public agricultural research, 
 1981-96
SOURCES: Latin America: Beintema, Avila, and Pardey (2001), Beintema, Romano, 
and Pardey (2000), Beintema, Zambrano et al. (2000), Beintema, Hareau et al. (2000), 
Beintema, Pardey et al. (2001a, b); Sub-Saharan Africa: Pardey, Roseboom, and 
Beintema (1997). Developed countries: Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1999) and 
OECD (2000).
NOTES: Number of countries included in regional totals are shown in parentheses. 
Sub-Saharan Africa shares are based on data for the 19 countries in Table 1 in Pardey, 
Roseboom, and Beintema (1997). The developed-country shares may understate the 
role of nonprofit institutions. Data for nonprofit agencies were absent for some 
countries, and spending by some nonprofits may have been reported in the 
government agency category.  na stands for not available.
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International Research
To overcome the biases against the development and diffu-
sion of agricultural technologies among developing coun-
tries, agricultural research that was internationally
conceived and funded began in the mid-1940s. It expanded
through the 1950s as the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations placed agricultural staff in less-developed
countries to work alongside scientists in national research
organizations on joint-venture research.These efforts
became the model for subsequent programs in interna-
tional agricultural research, as they evolved into the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the
Philippines in 1960 and the International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico in 1967.
Hoping to show that the model of international agricul-
tural research could achieve success in broad agroecolog-
ical regions as well as specific commodities, other
international centers were established in Nigeria (the
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, IITA) in 1967
and Colombia (the International Center for Tropical
Agriculture, CIAT) in 1968.
The further development of international agricultural
research centers took place largely under the auspices of
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR, or CG for short), established in 1971
as bilateral and multilateral donors bought into the
model.13 The CG system began modestly. Between 1960
and 1964, of the institutes that would become the CG,
only IRRI was operating as such. By 1970, the budgets of
the four founding centers totaled US$15 million. During
the next decade, the progressive expansion of the total
number of centers, and the funding per center, involved a
tenfold increase in nominal funding, to US$141 million in
1980. During the 1980s, funding continued to grow, more
than doubling in nominal terms, to reach US$305 million
in 1990, and although the rate of growth had slowed, it
was still impressive. In the 1990s, two decades of growth
came to an abrupt end.The number of centers continued
to grow—from 13 to 18 at one point, but now 16—but
funding did not grow enough in inflation-adjusted terms
to maintain the real funding per center, let alone the rate
of growth. In 2000, the CG spent US$305 million (in 1993
prices, or US$338 million in nominal terms), less than the
US$334 million (1993 prices) it spent in 1990 (Figure 5). If
funding for the CG had kept pace with the growth in agri-
cultural R&D investment in rich countries, the system
would have spent US$377 million (in nominal terms) in
2000. If its growth had matched that of agricultural R&D
spending in the less-developed countries, this would have
been US$526 million.
Although the CG markedly accelerated the spread of
new varieties of wheat, rice, and other technologies
(commonly called the Green Revolution), it spent only a
small, and of late,
declining, fraction of
the global agricultural
research investment.
In 1995, it repre-
sented just 1.5
percent of the nearly
$22 billion spent on
public-sector agricul-
tural research by
national agencies—
or 2.8 percent of the
research spending of
the less-developed
countries, down from
its 3.8 percent share
in 1985.14
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Figure 5  Real expenditures of the CGIAR, 1960-2000
SOURCES: Alston and Pardey (1999) and CGIAR (2000 and 2001).
NOTES: Expenditures for years pre-1972 represent funds going to precursor international 
research institutes (IRRI from 1960, CIMMYT from 1966, CIAT from 1966, and IITA from 
1971). Nominal US dollars are deflated to 1993 base-year prices using the 1960-98 implicit 
GDP deflator from the World Bank (2000); 1999 and 2000 deflators are from BEA (2001).
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International donor and aid agencies no
longer give agriculture, and with it agricul-
tural R&D, the attention they once did.
Precise data are hard to come by, but the
evidence suggests that after several decades
of strong support, international funding for
agriculture and agricultural research began
to decline around the mid-1980s as support
for economic infrastructure as well as
health, education, and other social services
began to grow. Regions of the world such as
Africa, where agricultural R&D relied on
donors for more than 40 percent of their
total funding in the early 1990s, were partic-
ularly hard hit.1
The following quantitative highlights show
the disconcerting decline in international aid
for agriculture and the research that directly
supports the sector:
• Even though the European Community
(EC) increased overall aid to developing
countries during the period 1987-98, aid
to agriculture declined substantially.
Agriculture accounted for 12 percent of
total EC contributions in the late 1980s,
but only 4 percent during 1996-98.2
• Over the past two decades,World Bank
lending to the rural sector has been
erratic, but after adjusting for inflation
the general trend has been downward.
Agriculture’s share of total lending has
also declined (from an average of 26
percent during the first half of the 1980s
to only 10 percent in 2000).3
• There is no discernable pattern in the amount of World Bank lending authorized for agricultural R&D, other than a
temporary increase in loan approvals in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and an exceptionally large amount of lending in
1998, resulting mostly from loans with large research components approved for India ($136 million, current prices),
China ($68 million), and Ethiopia ($60 million) (Figure B.3, panel a). 4 The size of each loan has been highly variable,
ranging from $0.1 million for Argentina in 1992 and Niger in 1997, to $136 million for India in 1998.
• The amount of funding USAID directed toward agricultural research in LDCs declined by 75 percent from the mid-
1980s to 1996 (Figure B.3, panel b).Asian countries suffered the largest losses, from around $57 million (in 1993
prices) in the mid-1980s to only $1.4 million in 1996. Support to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean was cut
less severely but by 1996, funding had fallen to only 42 percent of mid-1980s levels for Africa, and 32 percent for Latin
America and the Caribbean. Since 1996, USAID funding for agriculture has failed to regain the ground it lost, and we
expect funding for agricultural R&D has fared no better. 5
1 Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema (1997).
2 Cox and Chapman (1999).
3 World Bank Rural Development Department (2001).
4 These figures give no indication of the pattern of disbursements, a more meaningful measure for assessing the World Bank resources actually used to
support research.Total project costs (that is,World Bank lending and other—often local-government—contributions) of less than $5 million earmarked for
agricultural research, extension, and education were excluded from these calculations.
5USAID (2000).
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AID
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Figure B3  World Bank and USAID funding of agricultural research, by 
    region
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SOURCES:  USAID data from Alex (1997) and Dalrymple (2000). World Bank data 
are authors’ calculation based on World Bank, Rural Development Department (2001).
NOTES:  Nominal US dollars deflated to 1993 base-year prices using implicit GDP 
deflator from World Bank (2000) and BEA (2001). World Bank funding includes 
IBRD and IDA commitments to research only (that is, excluding extension and 
education), and omits funds provided to the CGIAR from the Development Grant 
Facility. Other includes Europe and Middle East. For USAID, global programs, 
CGIAR support, and CRSP programs are also included under other.
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Box 3
Attention is presently riveted on biotechnology
research. In 1994 the commercially unsuccessful Flavr-
Savr™ tomato (genetically engineered to retain its “fresh-
picked” flavor)16 heralded the beginning of a series of
innovations derived from genetic engineering. In the mid-
to late 1990s, commercially successful herbicide- and
insect-tolerant crop varieties such as Roundup Ready® or
Liberty Link® corn, cotton, and canola, or Bt corn and
cotton followed.
In stark contrast to private research done in many
other sectors (like electronics, engineering, information,
and most of medicine), the agricultural research carried
out by private biotechnology and life sciences firms is
controversial.17 However, little if anything is known about
the total private spending on agricultural research world-
wide, the overall mix of research in terms of its
commodity and technology focus, or aspects of its indus-
trial organization such as the size of the firms, their local
or multinational character, and the location of the
research (especially in terms of developed versus devel-
oping countries). In addition to biotechnology research,
large amounts are also spent on agrochemical research
and machinery related to agriculture, as well as very
sizable investments in food-processing research by
private firms. Our estimates on private R&D spending
span this broader range of activities, highlighting private
spending totals and the location of the research.
By the mid-1990s, about one-third of the $33 billion
total investment in agricultural research worldwide was
private (Table 2). But little of this research takes place in
developing countries.The overwhelming majority ($10.8
billion, or 94 percent of the global total) is conducted in
developed countries.18 In the less-developed countries
(LDCs), the private share of research is just 5.5 percent,
Table 2—Estimated global public and private agricultural R&D investments, circa 1995
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SOURCES: See Table 1 for details on public expenditures, which represent an annual average for the 1994-96 period. Private-sector estimates
for developed countries are also an annual average of 1994-96. Developing-country data for private research are either 1995 or 1996 estimates.
Estimates for nine Latin American countries are from Beintema and Pardey (2001). For China and five other Asian countries (India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand), estimates are based on country-specific references listed in Table 1. For other Asian countries (except South
Korea) and Latin American countries, as well as all the Middle East and North African countries, we assumed their private-sector shares of
total science spending were 3.8 percent, the estimated share for the nine Latin American countries. For South Korea, we assumed its private-
sector share was 9.1 percent, the same as our five-country Asian average.We took the share of private-sector spending in Sub-Saharan Africa
to be 2 percent of the total (that is, public and private) spending based on information obtained from various sources.
NOTES: Drawing together estimates from various sources meant there were unavoidable discrepancies in what constitutes “private” and
“public” research. For example, in the data made available to us, private spending in Asia included nonprofit producer organizations, whereas
we opted to include research done by nonprofit agencies as part of public research in Latin America and elsewhere when possible.
The Growing Private Sector
The efforts of individual innovators and companies in agriculture have always played a key role. In theUnited States, entrepreneurs such as John Deere, Cyrus McCormick, and the Wallace family (founders
of Wallace Seed Corn, later Pioneer) are part of agriculture’s long affair with capitalism. Most herbicides,
insecticides, and veterinary medicines were developed in the private sector15 (although they drew on discov-
eries made by public research), as well as many food-storage, -transport, and -processing technologies,
including the refrigerated railroad car and the grain elevator, to name but two. Private investment in chem-
ical, mechanical, and food-processing research is now substantial and rose rapidly in the latter part of the
20th century, at least until very recently.
Expenditures Shares
PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL
(million 1993 international dollars) (percent)
Developing Countries 11,469 672 12,141 94.5 5.5 100
Developed Countries 10,215 10,829 21,044 48.5 51.5 100
TOTAL 21,692 11,511 33,204 65.3 34.7 100
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and public funds are still the major source of support
(and remain a significant source of support in rich coun-
tries, too, accounting for about half their total funding).
Innovation systems are bound to involve duplication
and competition between the public and private sectors,
some of which helps spur science. But with some excep-
tions, private and public labs largely do different types of
research, even in rich countries. In the early 1990s,
around 12 percent of private research dealt with farm-
focused technologies, whereas over 80 percent of public
research had that orientation.19 Food and other posthar-
vest research accounted for 30 to 90 percent of private
agricultural R&D in rich countries, and in countries like
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, it
was the dominant focus of private agricultural research.
Chemical research was of comparatively minor impor-
tance in Australia and New Zealand, but it accounted for
more than 40 percent of private research in the United
Kingdom and the United States and nearly three-quarters
of private agricultural research in Germany.
There is a concentration of research in private firms
doing different types of research in different countries
(see Box 5). In the early 1990s, Japan, the United States,
and France account for 33 percent, 27 percent, and 8
percent, respectively, of all food-processing research
carried out by the private sector in the countries that
form the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Chemical research related to
agriculture is even more concentrated geographically: the
United States, Japan, and Germany respectively represent
Table B4 reports our best efforts to construct a global estimate of private and public spending on all science. We generated
direct estimates for 70 countries, including the most significant countries in science.1 Taking the 70-country total at face value
and scaling it up to represent a 139-country total, we estimate that in 1995 about $490 billion were spent on all the sciences
worldwide, about 1.6 percent of global GDP in that year. Rich countries did the preponderance of this research: about 85 percent
of the total, compared with only 0.6 percent in Africa, just 2.5 percent in Latin American countries, and 9.9 percent for Asia.
There are some similarities but some stark
differences, too, in the geographical pattern 
of spending on agricultural science (see Tables
1 and 3) and the sciences more generally.
To summarize,
• The share of LDCs in the world’s agricultural
science (37 percent, from Table 2) is much
higher than their share in science in general
(15 percent, from Table B4).
• Science in the South emphasizes agriculture
much more than science in the North. About
17 percent of Southern science relates
directly to agriculture, whereas less than 3
percent of Northern science is so oriented.
• Like the agricultural sciences, overall
research spending is concentrated in just a
handful of countries. About three-quarters
of all Southern science is done by just four
countries: India, China, South Korea, and
Brazil. Similarly, three rich countries domi-
nate scientific research in the North: The
United States, Japan and Germany did 71
percent of the total, with the United States
alone accounting for 42 percent of that total.
1The exceptions are the countries of the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe for which data were not avail-
able.According to Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet
(1994), in 1988 these countries collectively accounted for
17.3 percent of global science spending, well down from
the estimated 33 percent they spent in 1973.
AGRICULTURE’S SLICE OF THE GLOBAL SCIENCE PIE
Table B4—Global spending on science, circa 1995
SOURCES: UNESCO (1999), RICYT (2001), and OECD (2000).
NOTES: The number of countries included in regional totals are shown in parentheses.
UNESCO data for Africa,Asia, and Middle East and North Africa reported as R&D
spending as a percent of gross national product (GNP). Estimates of R&D expenditures
were formed using GNP data from World Bank (2000).Where available, RICYT data
were compiled in local currency units and converted to international dollars using PPPs
from World Bank (2000). Estimates for 1995 for some Latin American countries were
formed using observations for prior years. For 70 countries, it was possible to form a
direct, mostly 1995, estimate. For the remaining 69 countries, per capita income was
estimated for all countries using World Bank GNP and FAO population data. Countries
were grouped into several income classes, and using the direct estimates, we formed
averages of science spending as a share of GDP for each group.These group averages
were deemed representative of the spending shares for all the countries in each group
for which direct observations were unavailable and then applied to the respective GDP
figure to estimate the amount of spending on science.
aDeveloping-country total includes Bermuda and Greece, designated as middle-income
countries by the World Bank (1996) criteria used to group the countries here.
Science expenditures
REGION TOTAL SHARE OF TOTAL SHARE OF GDP
(million 1993 (percentage)
international dollars)
Developing countries (109)a 72,460 14.7 0.61
Africa (24) 2,818 0.6 0.34
Asia (43) 48,994 9.9 0.70
Latin America (28) 12,521 2.5 0.50
Middle East and North Africa (12) 7,472 1.5 0.57
Developed countries (30) 420,217 85.3 2.31
TOTAL (139) 492,677 100.0 1.64
Box 4
41 percent, 20 percent, and 10 percent of all reported
private-sector research along these lines.20
The type of R&D done by private firms has changed
over time. For example, in the United States, where time-
series data are available, research on agricultural machinery
dropped from 36 percent of the private-share total in
1960 to just 13 percent in 1966. Postharvest food-
processing research contracted, too, from 44 percent to
29 percent.Two of the more significant growth areas were
plant breeding and veterinary and pharmaceutical research.
Research spending on agricultural chemicals grew as well,
and now accounts for more than one-third of total private
agricultural R&D.
For those concerned about the plight of poor people
and poor countries, the present preoccupation with private
roles in agricultural R&D is misguided.As profitable markets
develop over the long run, the private sector will no doubt
play a much bigger role, but it is folly to think that private
research will substantively replace public science in
Southern countries anytime soon.Agricultural R&D—like
many other areas of research—still relies on significant
amounts of public support and is likely to continue to do so
for many years (perhaps always).This is especially true in
the poorer parts of the world where the incentives for
privately financed research are weak for reasons that will
take considerable time to change.And even in rich coun-
tries, much private science involves chemical and food-
processing concerns and crop and animal technologies
more suited to capital-intensive forms of commercial agri-
culture with high, off-farm, value-added aspects. It is more
than likely the scope of private biotechnology research will
expand (pending public acceptance and regulatory
approval), but much of the pretechnology research and
certain types of biotechnologies for which it is hard to
appropriate the benefits privately will continue to be a
problem of public policy in rich and poor countries alike.
There are prospects for public funding of private
research to tackle poor-country problems. Just as large
amounts of public funds are used to underwrite privately
performed health, defense, and other research with public-
good elements in rich countries, so too can subsidies, cofi-
nancing arrangements, joint ventures, contract research, or
other institutional instruments be used to tap private
research for the benefit of poor people. Private, not-for-
profit research is one largely unexplored option. Private
non-profits offer real promise for creatively bridging the
public-private divide that stems from different research
cultures and objectives as well as differing incentives and
abilities to address the changing intellectual property
regimes surrounding agricultural R&D.
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Many have expressed concerns about the concentration of private agricultural science in fewer firms and fewer countries.
It makes economic sense for there to be significant concentration in some aspects of agricultural R&D. In many farm-input
technologies (such as information processing,agricultural machinery,and various herbicide,pesticide,and fertilizer formulations),
the returns to scale for research are such that bigger research agencies tend to have lower unit costs. In addition, the results of
the research may be widely applicable in countries other than where the research was done.Because of these scale and spillover
features, the production economics of many agricultural technologies have much in common with other industrial R&D.
However, agriculture has three distinguishing features: the biological base of the industry, long production cycles, and the
jointness of agricultural enterprises. More particularly, the performance of some important agricultural technologies (for
example, many improved seed varieties, some agricultural machinery and chemical technologies, and all sorts of farming prac-
tices) is site-specific and strongly affected by agroecological conditions.This defines the size of the relevant market in ways
that are much less common in technologies arising from industrial R&D.
One way to think of this is in terms of the unit costs of making local research results applicable to other locations (say, by
adaptive research), which must be added to the local research costs.1 Such costs grow with the size of the market.A close
analogy can be drawn with spatial market models of food processing in which processing costs fall with throughput but input
and output transportation costs rise with throughput so that when the two elements of costs are combined, a U-shaped
average cost function is derived.2 Economies of size, scale, and scope in research mean that unit costs fall with the size of the
R&D enterprise, but these economies must be traded off against the diseconomies of distance and adapting site-specific
results (the costs of "transporting" the research results to economically "more distant" locations).Thus, as the size of the
research enterprise increases, unit costs are likely to decline at first (because economies of size are relatively important) but
will eventually rise (as the costs of economic distance become ever-more important).
1 Alston and Pardey (1996).
2 See for example Sexton (1990).
RESEARCH CONCENTRATION
Box 5
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This measure helps capture the complementary
nature of research investments, much as measuring labor
productivity as output per unit of labor carries with it
returns to the use of complementary land, capital, and
other purchased inputs.21 By analogy, research produces
new know-how and new and improved techniques that
act like additional inputs and raise productivity. Likewise,
R&D can improve the quality of an existing output (such
as enhancing the vitamin A content of rice), which can be
seen as increasing the amount of a bundle of outputs
(which includes both rice and vitamin A), thus raising
productivity.
The left-hand panel of Table 3 presents a measure of
agricultural research intensity (ARI), specifically, agricul-
tural research expenditures as percentages of agricultural
GDP. Figure 6 depicts the same information graphically.22
In 1995, as a group, developed countries spent $2.64 on
public agricultural R&D for every $100 of agricultural
output, a sizable increase over the $1.53 they spent per
$100 of output two decades earlier. Since 1975, research
intensities rose for the developing countries as a group,
but unevenly. Despite gaining a greater absolute share of
the developing world’s total agricultural research
spending (see Figure 1), China’s agricultural research
intensity in the mid-1990s was no greater than it was in
the mid-1980s. In other words, China’s research spending
grew, but its agricultural sector grew just as fast.Although
public research throughout the rest of Asia and Latin
America appears to have grown in intensity during the
last decade of our data,Africa has lost considerable
ground, with research intensities lower than in the 1970s.
The large and growing gap in research intensity
between rich and poor countries continues to widen
further in terms of total (private and public) spending
(Figure 7). In 1995, total spending intensities were more
than eight times higher in rich countries than they were
in poor ones; they were four times higher when only
public spending was used as the basis of the intensity
calculation.23
Richer countries invest public funds in agricultural
R&D more intensively than do poorer ones, but many
low-income countries invest more intensively in public
agricultural research than per capita income alone would
suggest. Public agricultural research intensities have a
Table 3—Selected public research intensity ratios, 1976-95
Research Intensities
One way to gauge the commitment of funds to either public or private agricultural research is tocompare it to national agricultural output, rather than measuring it in absolute terms, much as develop-
ment aid is often measured as a percentage of national gross domestic product (GDP).This relative measure
indicates the intensity of investment in agricultural research, not just the amount of total research spending.
Expenditures per 
Expenditures as a share of economically active
AgGDP Expenditures per capita agricultural population
1976 1985a 1995a 1976 1985a 1995a 1976 1985a 1995a
(percent) (1993 international dollars)
Developing countries 0.44 0.53 0.62 1.5 2.0 2.5 4.6 6.5 8.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.91 0.95 0.85 3.5 3.0 2.4 11.3 10.6 9.4
China 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.8 3.1 4.1
Other Asia 0.31 0.44 0.63 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.8 6.1 10.2
Latin America 0.55 0.72 0.98 3.4 4.0 4.6 26.0 36.0 45.9
Developed Countries 1.53 2.13 2.64 9.6 11.0 12.0 238.5 371.0 594.1
TOTAL 0.83 0.95 1.04 3.3 3.8 4.2 12.9 15.3 17.7
SOURCES: See Table 1. Agricultural GDP from World Bank (2000);Total and economically active agricultural population from FAO (2000).
NOTES: See Table 1.
aThree-year averages centered on 1985 and 1995.
tendency to decline as the importance of
agriculture in the domestic economy
(agricultural GDP as a share of total
GDP) increases, with, seemingly, a looser
link between agricultural research intensi-
ties and per capita income.24 For example,
some low-income countries with compar-
atively small agricultural sectors invest
quite intensively in agricultural R&D:
Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, and
Zambia all had intensity ratios between
2.2 percent and 3.7 percent in the early
1990s, comparable to those of Germany,
Japan, and the United States.25 The infor-
mation shown in Figure 8 uses long-run
data for the United States to dramatically
reinforce the notion of an inverse rela-
tionship.The general pattern is clear,
although there have been periodic rever-
sals in the trends of the constituent series
or the relationships between them.
Other research-intensity or spending
ratios can be calculated; two of these are
reported in Table 3. One measures agri-
cultural R&D spending relative to the size
of the economically active agricultural
population; the other, relative to total
population. In 1995, rich countries spent
more than nearly $590 per agricultural
worker, more than double the correspon-
ding 1976 ratio. Poor countries spent just
$8.50 per agricultural worker in 1995, less
than double the 1976 figure.These rich-
poor country differences are, perhaps, not
too surprising.A much smaller share of
the rich-country workforce is employed
in agriculture, and the absolute number of
agricultural workers declined more
rapidly in rich countries than it did in the
poor countries.
Agricultural research spending per
capita rose, too, by an average of 25
percent for developed countries (from
$9.60 per capita in 1975 to $12.00 in
1995) and 79 percent in developing coun-
tries (from $1.50 per capita in 1975 to
$2.50 in 1995). Notably, per capita
research spending (in terms of both total
population and agricultural workers)
declined in Africa, the only region of the
world where this occurred.
SL
O
W
 M
A
G
IC
 
14
Figure 6  Public agricultural research intensities, regional comparisons, 
 1976–95
1976    1985        1995
Developed countries
Sub-Saharan Africa
China
Other Asia
Latin America
Other
Developing countries
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Total
Percentage
SOURCES: See Table 3.
NOTES: See Table 3. Amounts shown for 1995 and 1985 are based on three-year 
averages centered on each of those two years.
Figure 7  Public, private, and total agricultural research intensities, 1995
Total     Private         Public
Developed countries
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SOURCES: See Tables 2 and 3.
NOTES: See Table 2.  Data represent three-year average centered on 1995.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
18
65
18
75
18
85
18
95
19
05
19
15
19
25
19
35
19
45
19
55
19
65
19
75
19
85
19
95
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Intensity ratio (public)
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l s
ha
re
 o
f t
ot
al
 G
D
P
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
Figure 8  US research intensities and agricultural output shares, 1865–2000
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These trends may actually understate the gap in
scientific knowledge. Science is a cumulative endeavor,
with a snowball effect. Innovations beget new ideas and
further rounds of innovation or additions to the cumula-
tive stock of knowledge.The mutually beneficial effects of
accumulating and exchanging ideas is why lone innovators
have largely given way to institutional approaches to
research, why scientific disciplines formed professional
organizations and spawned journals to capture and carry
forward findings, and why scientists seek out other scien-
tists at conferences, via the internet or other venues.And
so the size of the accumulated stock of knowledge, not
merely the amount of investment in current research and
innovative activity, gives a more meaningful measure of a
country’s technological capacity.
The current stock of knowledge and the contribu-
tion of past research spending to that stock is sensitive
to the types of science being done, the institutional struc-
tures surrounding the science, and the economic context
that affects the use of this stock. Some science spending
makes persistent and even perpetual contributions to the
changing stock of locally produced knowledge: the same
spending in societies ravaged by wars, institutional insta-
bility, and outright collapse may have a much more
ephemeral effect.
The sequential and cumulative nature of scientific
progress and knowledge is starkly illustrated by crop
improvement. It typically takes 7 to10 years of breeding
to develop a uniform, stable, and superior variety of
wheat, rice, or corn (with improved yield, grain quality, or
other attributes).Today’s breeders build on an accumula-
tion of knowledge built up by the breeders of yesterday.
Breeding lines from earlier research are used to develop
new varieties, so research of the distant past is still
feeding today’s research. New crops not only carry
forward the genes of earlier varieties, they also carry the
crop-breeding and -selection strategies made by earlier
breeders, whether they are the farmers who made the
selections over the first 10,000 years or the scientific
crosses and selections made by researchers during the
past 100 years.
Figure 9 shows a partial pedigree of the wheat
variety Pioneer 2375, released in February 1989 by
Pioneer-Hybrid International, the private company
mentioned in connection with the Wallace family (now
part of Dupont). Pioneer 2375 was one of several
commercially significant wheat varieties in Minnesota
during the early 1990s.26 This pedigree reveals the
persistent effects of research spending in the distant past
on current innovative activity. Pioneer 2375 was devel-
oped by crossing the varieties Olaf/Era/Suquamuxi68 and
Chris/ND487/Lark. Moving back through successive gener-
ations reveals that varieties developed or discovered as
long ago as 1873 (Turkey Red), 1901 (Federation), and 1935
(Norin 10) are part of this pedigree. Over 14 percent of
the varieties or breeding lines incorporated into Pioneer
2375’s pedigree were available prior to 1900, and at least
36 percent before 1940.27 The cumulative nature of this
process means that past discoveries and related research
are an integral part of contemporary agricultural innova-
tions. Conversely, the loss of a variety (or the details of
the breeding histories that brought it about) means the
loss of accumulated past research from the present stock
of knowledge.
Providing adequate funding for research is thus only
part of the story. Putting in place the policies and prac-
tices to accumulate innovations and increase the stock of
knowledge is an equally important and almost universally
unappreciated foundation. Discoveries and data that are
improperly documented or inaccessible (and effectively
exist only in the mind of the researcher) are lost from
the historical record when researchers retire from
science.These “hidden” losses seem particularly prevalent
in cash-strapped research agencies in the developing
world, where inadequate and often irregular amounts of
funding limit the functioning of libraries, data banks, and
genebanks, and hasten staff turnover.
There can be catastrophic losses, too, tied to the
political instability that is also a cause of hunger. Civil
strife and wars cause an exodus of scientific staff, or at
least a flight from practicing science. Most of Uganda’s
scientific facilities, for example, were in ruins when its
The eightfold difference in total research intensities illustrates the present gap in agriculture between richand poor countries. Moreover, the situation is growing worse.The difference in public research-intensity
ratios was 3.4-fold in the 1970s, compared with 4.2-fold now (it would be an even wider gap if private spending
were factored in).
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civil war ended in the early 1980s. It is hard to imagine
that today’s Congo once had among the most sophisti-
cated scientific infrastructure in colonial Africa, compa-
rable to the facilities and quality of staff found in most
developed countries at the time.28
To construct money metrics of the knowledge
stocks for US agriculture, we developed an annual series
of public agricultural R&D spending from 1862 (the first
year of operation of the United States Department of
Agriculture and federal funding for the land-grant univer-
sities) to 2000.29 The private-sector R&D series stretches
back to 1850. Private research (often an individual initia-
tive in its earlier years) is a long-established feature of US
agriculture, beginning well before governments got
directly involved and, for most years, spending more than
the public sector.30
Agricultural research in Africa started in Britain’s
Central and Eastern African colonies at the turn of the
20th century, with renewed spurts of spending after
World War II (when the Colonial Research Fund became
operational in the early 1940s) and again in the 1960s as
large injections of donor dollars underwrote the shift to
independent, postcolonial governments.The French
government began investing in agricultural research in its
West African colonies after 1943 (a little later than the
British), mainly when it created the Office de la
Recherche Scientifique Coloniale.31 Our African agricul-
tural research series runs from 1900 to 2000 (the figures
for public research are based on direct estimates since
1960 and synthetic estimates for earlier years, with a
synthetic series for private research since 1900).
We generated money measures of the stock of
scientific knowledge based on research performed in the
United States (assuming a baseline depreciation rate of 3
percent per annum) and Africa (assuming the same 3
percent baseline depreciation rate and also a deprecia-
tion rate of 6 percent per year, perhaps more realistic
given the instability and lack of infrastructure for R&D
throughout much of the region).32 Knowledge stocks in
1995—representing a discounted accumulation of
research spending from 1850 for the United States and
from 1900 for Africa—were expressed as percentages of
1995 AgGDP to normalize for differences in the size of
the respective agricultural sectors (Figure 10).The accu-
mulated stock of knowledge in the United States was
about 11 times more than the amount of agricultural
output produced in 1995. In other words, for every $100
of agricultural output, there existed a $1,100 stock of
knowledge to draw upon. In Africa, the stock of scientific
knowledge in 1995 was actually less than the value of
African agricultural output that year.The ratio of the US
knowledge stock relative to US agricultural output in
1995 was nearly 12 times higher than the corresponding
amount for Africa. If a depreciation rate for Africa of 6
percent instead of 3 percent is used, the gap in American
and African ratios is more than fourteenfold.
These measures suggest the immensity, if not the
outright impossibility, of playing catch-up, and the conse-
quent need to transmit knowledge across borders and
continents.The measures also underscore the need to
raise current levels of funding for agricultural R&D
throughout the region while also developing the policy
and infrastructure needed to accelerate the rate of
knowledge accumulation in Africa over the long haul.
Developing local capacity to carry forward findings will
yield a double dividend: increasing local innovative capaci-
ties while also enhancing the ability of African science to
tap discoveries made elsewhere. Not least, this calls for
increasing investments in primary,
secondary, and higher education, which is
essential if the generation and accumula-
tion of knowledge is to gain the
momentum required, putting economies
on a path to lift people out of poverty.33
Figure 10  Knowledge stock intensities, 1995
SOURCE:  Constructed by the authors.
NOTE:  d = depreciation rate.
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How are the LDCs faring regarding the new biotechnologies? Reliable investment data do not yet exist,not least because of difficulties in pinning down exactly what is meant by “agricultural biotechnology.”
Some of the measurement problems are related to the prominent role of the private sector. Firms are reluc-
tant to reveal much information for fear of revealing too much to their competitors.Table 4 provides some
indications of the extent of experimentation, the rate of release, and the speed of uptake of these new tech-
nologies, contrasting the situation in rich and poor countries.
Agricultural Biotechnologies
By the end of 2000, over 11,500 field trials for trans-
genic crop technologies had occurred in 39 countries.
While the number of countries permitting field trials was
evenly divided between developed and developing coun-
tries, the location of the trials was not. Much more of the
technology testing takes place in rich counties, where
over 80 percent of the trials occurred, with the United
States accounting for more than half the world total. Less
than 20 percent of the trials were conducted in the LDCs.
Likewise, the location of approved “events” is some-
what lopsided. An “event” involves the insertion of a
specific gene in a particular crop, resulting in the expres-
sion of a desired trait in that crop. For example, insertion
of the Bt cry1(c) protein producing gene into a particular
cotton variety is considered an event. By the end of 2000,
more than 180 crop events involving 15 basic phenotypic
(physical) characteristics had been deregulated or
approved for planting, feed, or food use in at least one of
27 countries and for at least one of 14 crops. Successfully
modified traits important for the major agricultural crops
include delayed ripening, herbicide tolerance, insect
resistance, modified color or oil, male sterility/fertilizer
restoration (used, for example, in breeding hybrid vari-
eties of corn and other crops), and virus resistance. Most
of the approvals have been issued in the United States
and Canada, with few so far in developing countries.
Table 4—Biotechnology indicators
FIELD TRIALSa NUMBER OF AREA UNDER TRANSGENICSb
Number of Share of APPROVED Number of Share of
EVENTS/CROPSa
Crop
Private within
Global in-country country/ Global
Countries Trials total total Countries Events Crops Countries Crops Area regionc total  
(million (percentage)
acres)
(percentage)
Developed Countries 20 9,701 84.2 na 19 160 14 7 na 77.5 na 74.2
United States 1 6,337 55.0 83.4 1 49 14 1 3 69.6 41.0 66.6
Canada 1 1,233 10.7 63.9 1 49 4 1 4 7.4 17.6 7.1
All others 18 2,131 18.5 na 17 62 5 5 na 0.5 na 0.5
Developing countries 19 1,822 15.8 na 8 23 4 8 na 26.9 na 25.8
Argentina 1 393 3.4 90.1 1 7 3 1 3 24.7 84.1 23.7
China 1 45 0.4 na 1 5 4 1 1 1.2 12.4 1.2
All others 17 1,384 12.0 na 6 11 3 6 na 1.0 na 0.9
TOTAL 39 11,523 100.0 na 27 183 14 15 na 104.4 na 100.0
SOURCE: Pardey and Zambrano (in preparation).
NOTES: na stands for not available.
a Data through to December 2000, when available. For the United States, Canada, and perhaps other countries, a single “trial” may consist of
tests conducted at multiple (sometimes many) different sites.
b Area for year 2000.
c Indicates share of transgenic acreage for crops with some transgenic varieties.
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These geographical imbalances carry through to the
technology-use stage as well.Although transgenic crops
were grown in eight LDCs by the end of 2000 (compared
with only seven developed countries), almost three-
quarters of the world’s transgenic acreage was located in
rich counties.The United States alone accounted for
two-thirds of the world’s transgenic crop acreage. Close
to 60 percent of US transgenic crop acreage was sown to
herbicide-resistant soybeans (mainly Roundup Ready®),
followed by corn at 28 percent (mostly insect resistant),
and cotton at 18 percent.Argentina came second with
nearly 24 percent of the global transgenic crop total
(virtually all Roundup Ready® soybeans), Canada was
third with 7 percent (predominantly herbicide-tolerant
canola), and China, fourth with 1.2 percent (all transgenic
cotton).
The transgenic share of a particular crop in a partic-
ular country is quite variable.About 84 percent of the
combined soybean, cotton, and maize acreage in
Argentina is sown to transgenic varieties, although most
of this acreage consists of herbicide-tolerant soybeans. In
2000 about 12 percent of the Chinese cotton crop is
planted with insect-resistant strains. In the United States,
41 percent of the combined cotton, corn, and soybean
acreage was transgenic.This increased to 49 percent in
2001, with a quarter of the corn acreage, and two-thirds
of both the cotton and soybean acreage planted to trans-
genic varieties that year.34 The absence of regulatory
approvals for the commercial use of transgenic varieties
(as distinct from trials) is a major reason why LDCs are
lagging behind.Another is the lag in getting genetic traits
into varieties appropriate for different regions, which also
accounts for substantial regional differences in the rate of
uptake within a country such as the United States. Finally,
the lack of desirable traits in crops of significance to poor
people is a serious constraint.Virus resistance in several
noncommercial potato varieties is being tested in trials in
Mexico, as is virus resistance in yams in Africa (with
vitamin-A-enhanced rice and other quality-enhanced
crops targeted to poor consumers still some way off),
but as yet, none are ready for release to farmers.
Moreover, the pipeline of biotechnologies suitable for
LDCs has barely been primed, which is not at all
surprising given the comparatively small sums of money
invested to date. For example, in 1998, the CG centers
collectively spent just $25 million on biotechnology
research.35 That same year, Monsanto invested $1.26
billion in R&D.
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Although nations have sometimes monopolized key genetic resources, until recently, agricultural technologies (including new plant varieties and the processes and parent material required to develop
them) have been unencumbered by proprietary claims and freely available to all. Beginning in the 1980s, a
revolution occurred in the effective protection of proprietary claims, particularly in agricultural biotechnology,
where the scope of intellectual property was extended to encompass biological material.The geographic
scope of the claims has been increasing, too.All 141 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
including the poorest of the LDCs, ostensibly must comply with their commitment to Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) by 2005, although this timetable seems to be slipping and the status of plants
as patentable subject matter remains unclear and controversial.There are 114 members of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) administered by the United Nation’s World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) that ensures basic and reciprocal standards for intellectual property protection among countries, and
49 countries, including 28 LDCs, are signatories to the UPOV Convention (the International Union for the
Protection of New Plant Varieties) that extends certain property rights to plant breeders (Table 5).
The Rights to Research
The protection of intellectual property can be a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, granting rights to intel-
lectual property provides incentives to innovate and to
reveal new knowledge that may otherwise be kept
secret. On the other hand, the cumulative nature of agri-
cultural research means that the proliferation of patents
makes it increasingly difficult for public institutions and
private start-ups to be active participants in biotech-
nology research. Moreover, the needs of industry and
agricultural progress are yet to be properly reconciled
with the rights of indigenous peoples and poor farmers
who maintained many of the landraces on which today’s
improved varieties depend.
In agricultural biotechnology, the most visible and
controversial field of agricultural research, the portion of
the key technology protected as intellectual property is
now highly concentrated in the hands of a small number
of large, multinational corporations based in North
Table 5—Intellectual property indicators
Number of
Number of Number of International Union
World Trade Patent for the Protection of
Total number Organization Cooperation New Plant Varieties 
Region of countriesa membersb Treaty membersb membersb
Developed countries 50 31 30 22
Developing countries 157 110 84 27
TOTAL 207 141 114 49
SOURCE: Pardey and Zambrano (in preparation).
NOTES:
a Represents number of countries identified in World Bank (2000).
b Represents country status as of August 2001.
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America and Western Europe. Now, the very intellectual
property rights that were associated with the surge of
private research in biotechnology may block access to new
developments by public-sector and nonprofit researchers.
As patenting becomes more prevalent, the number of
separate rights needed to produce a new innovation prolif-
erates. If ownership of these rights is diffuse and uncertain,
the multilateral bargaining problem can become difficult to
resolve. Instead of overexploitation of a common property
with low entry costs, there is underexploitation of a pool
of intellectual property due to the high costs of access—a
manifestation of the so-called “tragedy of the anticom-
mons,” which occurs when too many individuals have rights
of exclusion in a scarce resource.This is a problem that
plagues not just agriculture but also research in the health
sciences.36
Many think the international proliferation of intellec-
tual property rights and regimes currently impedes agricul-
tural research that is conducted in, or of consequence to,
developing countries.Answering this question requires an
understanding of the jurisdictional extent of intellectual
property, the geographic pattern of production, and the
extent and nature of South-North trade flows. Rights to
intellectual property are confined to the jurisdictions
where they are granted.There is no such thing as an inter-
national patent. Gaining patent rights in the United States
confers no intellectual property rights in China; a patent in
China must also be sought and awarded to confer rights in
that jurisdiction.
The extent of freedom to operate (the ability to prac-
tice or use an innovation) in less-developed countries is not
well understood. For example, the recent innovation
involving vitamin A in rice reportedly required permission
for more than 70 patent rights.The well-publicized dona-
tions of their relevant technologies by major corporations
left a strong impression that enforcement of large numbers
of crucial patents was being relinquished in favor of the
poor in developing countries. In fact, in some major rice-
consuming countries, there are no valid relevant patents.
There are very few, if any, in the countries where most
poor, malnourished consumers reside.
Freedom to operate depends on specific circum-
stances.The intellectual property rights assigned to the key
enabling technologies currently used to transform crops
are mainly held in, and therefore primarily relevant to, rich-
country jurisdictions.37 Thus, for most of the staple crops
that matter for food security in poor countries, the
researcher’s freedom to operate in such nations is
currently not the main issue. However, as poorer devel-
oping countries become compliant with their intellectual
property commitments to the WTO, patent applications are
increasingly lodged in developing countries, and the lines
between nonprofit and commercial research become more
blurred, there will most certainly be problems for research
on some staple food crops.There are options to address
the problems of access to technology, but they are yet to
be fully developed and often require access to professionals
who are well-versed in intellectual property and in woefully
short supply in most LDCs.38
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At the beginning of a new century, public investment and institutional initiatives for agricultural R&D in the South are waning and the South-North gap is no longer shrinking.Agricultural science spending,
be it public or private, has slowed in many regions of the world, and for many countries within these regions.
During the 1990s, public spending actually shrank in Africa and stalled in the rich countries, while many aid
agencies reduced their support for agricultural R&D for Southern agriculture. Consequently, growth in the
stock of publicly generated knowledge in the North is slowing, thereby limiting the pool of science and tech-
nologies that can spill over to the South. It also has less relevance for the South now that much public research
in rich countries is focused not on traditional agricultural production technologies but on local environmental
and food-safety concerns and on the quality of foods preferred by richer people. Moreover, the slowdown of
science in the South limits the potential of poor countries to develop locally relevant technologies and tap into
Northern knowledge stocks.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding intellectual property rights
and agricultural R&D must be placed in a longer-term
framework.The role of the private sector in agricultural
research is increasing, but private investment covers only
a small subset of the needs and is mostly a complement,
not a substitute, for continued public and other nonprofit
research. For many developing countries, the performance
of the latter is now hampered more by lack of funding
than by issues related to intellectual property rights.
The social payoffs to investing in agricultural R&D
have been high for rich and poor countries alike. 39
Although some think the easy gains have been made, with
diminished returns to more recent research, there is no
evidence in the extensive impact assessment literature to
bear this out.The estimated returns to agricultural R&D
are as high now as they ever were, high enough to justify
an even greater investment of public funds.
Reinvigorating support for Southern science is
unquestionably the top priority. But funding alone is not
sufficient to close the South-North gap. Developing effec-
tive public-private partnerships—certainly much easier
said than done, but by no means impossible—is another
requirement; making efficient and effective use of the
dollars invested in Southern science is yet another.
Getting the political commitment to deal seriously with
these problems is tough, and tougher still because of the
long-term nature of the commitment required. Science,
especially for agriculture, is not a stop-start affair: a
sizable and sustained effort is needed, beginning now and
continuing for decades to come if the prospects for
growth and development that science has to offer the
South are to materialize. Unquestionably, another century
is too long to wait.
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Notes
1. Fowler (1994).
2. Maddison (2001).
3. Unless otherwise stated, all data on research expenditures are reported in 1993 prices and in international dollars
(see Box 2).
4. Wherever possible, we have used the internationally accepted statistical procedures and definitions developed by the
OECD (1994) and UNESCO (1984) for compiling R&D statistics.We grouped our estimates into three major institu-
tional categories: government agencies, agencies of higher education, and business enterprises.The latter category
includes two subcategories of relevance for our study: private enterprises and nonprofit institutions.We have defined
public agricultural research to include government agencies, agencies of higher education, and nonprofit institutions.
5. Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson (1991).
6. Work underway by Fan, Qian, and Zhang (2001) points to continued growth in agricultural R&D spending in China
during the latter part of the 1990s.
7. Beintema and Pardey (2001).
8. Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema (1997).
9. Of course, economic aspects, such as differences in relative factor prices (say the price of labor versus capital), mean
that different locations are more or less suitable for different production methods, agricultural or not. For example,
when labor is expensive relative to land or capital, farmers tend to demand and adopt technologies like larger tractors
or chemical or genetic methods of weed control that save labor relative to the less expensive factors of production.
10. More refined agroecologies using rainfall, soil type, and land slope and elevation, among other things, are often
required to meaningfully assess the impact and spillover potential of agricultural technology, as described by Alston et
al. (2000b) in the context of Latin America.
11. Based on data summarized in Wood, Sebastian, and Scherr (2000).
12. This change in shares represents the combined effect of a significant increase in spending by nonprofits and a contrac-
tion in spending by government agencies, especially since the mid-1980s.
13. For more details on institutional developments related to the CGIAR, see Baum (1986), Gryseels and Anderson
(1991), Anderson (1998), and Alston and Pardey (1999).
14. The CGIAR is not the only organization doing agricultural R&D for developing countries.Two large, French agencies
engaged in tropical agricultural research are the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le
Développement (CIRAD), established in 1984 from a merger of various French institutes operating mainly in Africa,
many since the 1940s, and the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), formerly Office de la Recherche
Scientifique et Technique Outre-mer, (ORSTOM). In 1998, these two agencies spent a total of $154 million (1993 interna-
tional dollars) on agricultural R&D, about half the total expenditure of the CGIAR in that year. IRD does mainly basic
research, with about 40 percent of its research directed toward agriculture and the rest related to environmental,
health, and social issues. CIRAD focuses almost exclusively on internationally traded cash crops, such as cotton, oil
palm, coffee, cocoa, and rubber, and has a more applied approach. Little of CIRAD’s and IRD’s spending involves direct
financial support to developing-country organizations. Most of their resources are spent on the salaries of French
research staff, the majority of whom are now based in France. More than one-half of each agency’s operating and
capital budget is also spent in France.Thus, much of the French government support to agricultural R&D in LDCs via
CIRAD and IRD now takes the form of in-kind rather than cash contributions.
15. In this report, private research denotes research performed by private, for-profit enterprises.
16. Although the tomatoes achieved the delayed-softening and taste-retention objectives of their developers, yields were
poor, mechanical handling equipment turned most of them into mush before they got to market, and consumers
weren’t willing to pay enough of a premium over conventional fresh tomatoes to cover costs.The biotechnology
protests started with the Flavr-Savr™ when Jeremy Rifkin (author of The Biotech Century) managed to persuade
Campbell’s Soup not to use biotech tomatoes in its products (Kasler and Lau 2000).
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17. Allegedly much of the opposition stems from concerns about the food safety and environmental consequences of the
technologies. However, some of the concerns seem to relate to the private-for-profit nature of the research itself,
including presumptions about the exercise of monopoly power. Jefferson (2001) discusses and elaborates on this idea.
18. In contrast, in 1996 the private sector footed the bill for two-thirds of total science spending for 22 member countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig 1999).
19. Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1999).
20. These data exclude Switzerland, whose share of agricultural chemical R&D is likely to be substantial but unlikely to
place it in the top three performers.
21. For example, a farmer working just half a hectare of land is likely to produce more if she has a whole hectare to farm
(the productivity of labor increases as the intensity of land use relative to labor increases). Similarly, the amount of rice
harvested from a quarter of a hectare is likely to be higher if nitrogen fertilizer is applied than if it is not used (land
productivity increases as the intensity of fertilizer use relative to land increases.)
22. Agricultural GDP is a “value-added” measure of agricultural output that represents the gross value of output minus
the value of purchased inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery. Hence, these research-intensity ratios are
higher than, and not directly comparable with, other research-intensity ratios that divide agricultural research
spending by the gross value of output.
23. We estimate a research intensity of 5.43 percent for rich countries in 1995 when using the total of public and private
spending to form the measure, compared with 0.66 percent for poor countries.
24. Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1992).
25. In 1994-96, agricultural GDP was about 17 percent of total African GDP, and the region’s average per capita income
was US$551 (in 1995 prices). If Africa followed the historical pattern of the United States, based on a consideration of
per capita income alone, its public research intensity would be well less than 0.05 percent, the US figure for 1900
(estimating Africa’s per capita income in 2000 to be $1,375, less than the $3,182 per capita in the United States in
1900. Both figures are in 1993 international dollars.)  Based on agricultural output shares, Africa’s research intensity
would be in the range of 0.05-0.09 percent (the US figure for most of the first decade of the 20th century when agri-
culture was about 22 percent of the gross domestic product). In fact,Africa’s research intensity was 0.85.
26. Pioneer 2375 was the leading variety in Minnesota during the 1990s and was planted on nearly half the state’s wheat
acreage by the middle of the decade.
27. Another distinctive aspect of the pedigree is the pool of international expertise and germplasm that Pioneer 2375
represents. It includes material developed in Russia,Australia, Japan, Canada, and parts of the United States outside
Minnesota. In fact, 7.5 percent of the 133 nodes in the pedigree that we could trace involved material from Africa, 9
percent from Europe, 11 percent from Latin America, and 27 percent from US states other than Minnesota.
28. These same problems constrain not only the accumulation but the generation of knowledge.The effectiveness of
science spending in developing new knowledge is also affected by the composition of funding (too many LDCs employ
scientists with insufficient funds to plant or maintain field trials, properly stock laboratories, and so on). In addition, the
downtime doing research is often higher in LDCs than in rich countries because of the poorer infrastructure for
communications and transport, for example. Lower (and “lost” or late) salaries also lower the quality of scientific staff
that can be hired or retained.
29. The series includes spending on intramural USDA research, as well as research conducted by the US Forest Service
and the state agricultural experiment stations located within the land-grant universities.
30. At least according to the estimates developed by Huffman and Evenson (1993). Policies to promote private science
date back at least to the US Constitution, ratified in 1788, which lays down the legal authority for the US patent
system by giving Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
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31. Belgium, not the British or French, had the largest and most sustained commitment to agricultural research in Africa
prior to 1960.These activities were centered in the Belgian Congo and formalized in 1933 when Belgium established
the Institute National pour l’Étude Agronomique du Congo Belge, which eventually established a network of 36 research
stations throughout the Congo. See Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson (1991) for more details.
32. The lag length relating innovations, It, to present and past research expenditures, Rt-s, was taken to be 10 years for
both regions, so the stock of knowledge for year t, Kt, was formed as Kt = (1-d) Kt-1 + It, where d is the rate of knowl-
edge depreciation and It = ∑
10
s=o
Rt-s .
33. See Beintema, Pardey, and Roseboom (1998) for a description of the woeful state of many agricultural universities
throughout Africa.
34. NASS (2001).
35. Morris and Hoisington (2000).
36. Heller and Eisenberg (1998).
37. Binenbaum et al. (2000).
38. Nottenburg, Pardey, and Wright (2001).
39. Alston et al. (2000a).
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AgGDP agricultural gross domestic product
ARI agricultural research intensity
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical
CIMMYT Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo
CIRAD Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour
le Développement
CRSP Collaborative Research Support Program
FTE full-time equivalent
GDP gross domestic product
GNP gross national product
EC European Community
IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
IMF International Monetary Fund
IP intellectual property
IRD Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
IRRI International Rice Research Institute
LDC less-developed countries
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ORSTOM Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-mer
PFP partial-factor productivity
PPP purchasing-power parity
R&D research and development
TRIP trade-related aspects of intellectual property
SPS sanitary and phytosanitary
TBT technical barriers to trade
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
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